Paul Kagame n’Ubushake bwo Gukoresha Social Media mu Kurengera Isura ye

Ku wa 25 Kanama 2025, Perezida Paul Kagame yagejeje ijambo ku basirikare, abapolisi n’abacungagereza barenga 6,000 mu Kigo cya Gisirikare ya Gabiro, mu Ntara y’Iburasirazuba. Iki kiganiro cyibanze ku mutekano w’igihugu, imyitwarire ikwiriye kuranga inzego z’umutekano, ndetse n’ibibazo byo mu karere. Mu magambo atari asanzwe, Kagame yasabye ko Abanyarwanda bose bagomba gukoresha social media mu gusubiza ibivugwa kuri we n’u Rwanda. Yemeje ko iyo umuntu avuze ku Rwanda, aba avuze kuri we ubwe, bityo ko ari inshingano za buri wese kumurengera no kurengera igihugu.

Aya magambo agaragaza byinshi ku miterere y’ubutegetsi bwe: gukoresha igitugu mu gucunga ibitekerezo, gusibanganya itandukaniro hagati y’igihugu n’umuyobozi, no kubaka ishusho y’impimbano imbere y’amahanga.

Mu bihugu bifite demokarasi, Perezida ni umuntu watoranyijwe, ashobora kunengwa cyangwa kugaragazwaho amakosa, ariko ibyo ntibihita byitirirwa igihugu cyose. Mu Rwanda, Kagame akoresha imvugo ishyira igihugu n’umuyobozi mu cyiciro kimwe. Bivuze ko umuntu uvuga ku Rwanda aba yibasira Kagame, kandi unenga Kagame aba yibasira igihugu.

Iyi mvugo igamije guca intege abantu bose bashobora kugira igitekerezo gitandukanye. Buri wese utavuga nk’ubutegetsi ashyirwa mu rwego rw’“abanzi b’igihugu”. Ni uburyo bwo gukomeza igitugu, aho ubuyobozi budashaka gutandukanya igihugu n’umuyobozi umwe.

Mu Rwanda, itangazamakuru riragenzurwa bikomeye. Freedom House ishyira igihugu mu cyiciro cya “Not Free”, ivuga ko ubwisanzure bwo kuvuga bumeze nabi. Human Rights Watch na Amnesty International bigaragaza ko abanyamakuru, abanyapolitiki n’abaharanira uburenganzira bwa muntu bahura n’itotezwa, gufungwa no gutotezwa. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ivuga ko u Rwanda ruri mu bihugu bifite igitutu gikomeye ku itangazamakuru, aho benshi mu banyamakuru bahunze cyangwa bakabura.

Urugero rugaragara ni urupfu rw’umunyamakuru John Williams Ntwali mu 2023, rutigeze rukorwaho iperereza ryigenga nubwo imiryango mpuzamahanga yarusabye. Ibi byose bigaragaza ko igihugu kirangwa n’ubutegetsi bw’igitugu, aho inkuru zose zigomba kujya mu murongo w’ubutegetsi.

Social Media nk’Intwaro

Perezida Kagame ubwe afite konti ku mbuga nkoranyambaga nka Twitter (X), Facebook, na YouTube. Aho kwifashishwa nk’uburyo bwo gutanga ijwi ritandukanye, social media mu Rwanda ikoreshwa mu kwamamaza ibikorwa bya Leta no gusubiza abayinenga. Minisiteri n’inzego zitandukanye za Leta zifite social media zikora nk’amaso n’amatwi ya Leta. Hari n’itangazamakuru rya Leta kandi naryo rikoresha social media zibanda kuri Kagame. Ibyo ariko kuri Kagame ntibihagije. Ntibimuhagije na gato.

Kuba Perezida Kagame asaba abaturage bose kuyifashisha mu kumurengera bisobanura ko social media ihindutse intwaro ya propaganda, aho kuba urubuga rw’ubwisanzure. Abavuga ibitandukanye baribasirwa, abandi bakitwa abanzi b’igihugu.

Ipfunwe n’Ubwoba

Nubwo afite ubutegetsi bukomeye mu gihugu imbere, Kagame aracyafite ipfunwe. Impamvu:

• Diaspora nyarwanda, cyane cyane mu Burayi no muri Amerika, ikomeza gutanga amakuru y’uko mu Rwanda hadakurikizwa uburenganzira bwa muntu.
• Raporo za HRW na Amnesty zerekana gufungwa no gutotezwa kw’abatavuga rumwe.
• RSF igaragaza ko itangazamakuru rigenzurwa cyane, kandi abanyamakuru bagera kuri benshi barahunze cyangwa baricwa.

Ibi byose bigaragaza ko n’ubwo mu gihugu imbere ahacunze, Kagame atinya ukuri gutambuka hanze. Ni yo mpamvu yifuza ko buri muturage aba “umurinzi w’isura ye” kuri social media.

Iyo abaturage basabwa kuba abarinzi b’isura y’umuyobozi, bahindurwa ibikoresho aho kuba abafite ijwi. Social media irahinduka urubuga rw’igitugu, aho gutanga ibitekerezo bisigara ari icyaha. Abaturage benshi baracecetse, abandi bakoresha amazina y’amayoberane, abandi bagahitamo guceceka burundu.

Ibi byose byerekana ko ubwisanzure bukomeza kugabanuka, kandi igihugu kikiyubakira ku gitugu aho ku bwisanzure.

Perezida Kagame yubatse ishusho y’u Rwanda mu maso y’amahanga nk’igihugu gifite iterambere, umutekano n’imiyoborere myiza. Iyi shusho ikunze kwitwa na bamwe “well-camouflaged dictatorship” – ubutegetsi bw’igitugu bwihishe inyuma y’imyitwarire myiza.

Ariko inyuma y’iyo shusho, ukuri ni uko abaturage babujijwe ubwisanzure, abatavuga rumwe barafungwa cyangwa bakicwa, itangazamakuru rigenzurwa, kandi abaturage bahindurwa abakozi b’ubutegetsi mu kwamamaza isura y’umuyobozi umwe.

Amagambo ya Perezida Kagame yavugiwe i Gabiro ku wa 25 Kanama 2025 agaragaza uburyo ubutegetsi bwe bukoresha igitugu, igenzura no kubeshya mu gucunga ibitekerezo no kurinda isura ye. Kuba abaturage basabwa kuba abarinda isura ya Perezida ku mbuga nkoranyambaga si uburyo bwo kubaka igihugu cy’ubwisanzure, ahubwo ni uburyo bwo gusibanganya ukuri no kubeshya amahanga.

Mu by’ukuri, u Rwanda rwa Kagame rwubatse ishusho nziza y’impimbano mu maso y’amahanga, ariko imbere mu gihugu, abaturage bafashwe nk’ibikoresho, ubwisanzure bw’umuturage buhinduwe icyaha, kandi igihugu cyose gikomeza kwiranywa n’ umuyobozi umwe  wacyo ariwe Paul Kagame.

Claude Banyamfura
Rwandan Rights Alliance

 

Paul Kagame n’Ubushake bwo Gukoresha Social Media mu Kurengera Isura ye

 Mu magambo aherutse kuvugwa na Perezida Paul Kagame w’u Rwanda, yavuze ko ashaka ko buri wese akoresha imbuga nkoranyambaga (social media) mu gusubiza ibivugwa cyangwa ibyandikwa kuri we. Kagame yagaragaje ko iyo umuntu avuze ku Rwanda, aba avuze kuri we ku giti cye, bityo ko ari ngombwa ko abanyarwanda bose bifatanya mu kurengera isura ye n’iy’igihugu. Aya magambo agaragaza byinshi ku miterere ya politiki yo mu Rwanda, uburyo bwo kugenzura ibitekerezo, ndetse n’uko ubuyobozi bwa Kagame bwubakiye ku gitugu no kumvikanisha ko igihugu n’umuyobozi umwe ari ikintu kimwe.

Guhuza Perezida n’Igihugu

Mu buryo busanzwe mu bihugu byinshi, Perezida cyangwa abayobozi bakuru bashyirwa mu majwi cyangwa bakavugwaho ibintu byinshi bitandukanye, ariko ntibihita byitirirwa igihugu cyose. Mu Rwanda, Kagame agaragaza ko kuba umuntu yamunenga cyangwa akamuvugaho ibintu bibi ari nko kunenga igihugu cyose. Ibi bigamije kubaka umuco wo gukumira ikinyuranyo cyose, kuko umuntu wese ushobora kugira ikiganiro gitandukanye n’ibyo ubutegetsi buvuga, ahita afatwa nk’uwibasira igihugu. Kagame kandi yanavuze ko nabo bamuvuga nabi ku nkoranya mgaga baraswa.Ni uburyo bwo gusaba abaturage kwifatanya n’umuyobozi aho kwibuka ko hariho itandukaniro hagati y’igihugu n’umuntu umwe uyobora.

Igenzura ku Binyamakuru n’Itangazamakuru

Kagame mu Rwanda afite ububasha bukomeye ku binyamakuru byose bikorera imbere mu gihugu. Itangazamakuru ryigenga ryaragabanyijwe cyane, ibinyamakuru byinshi bikomeye bikorera hanze y’igihugu cyangwa bikoresha abakorera mu buhungiro. Mu gihugu imbere, ibinyamakuru bya Leta, amaradiyo, televiziyo ndetse n’imbuga nkoranyambaga z’ibyo binyamakuru byose, zikorwa mu bwoba cyane  cyane mu kwandika cyangwa kuvuga ikintu cyaba gitandukanye n’umurongo wa Leta. Kubera iyo mpamvu, kuba Perezida Kagame asaba abaturage bose kongera imbaraga mu kurengera isura ye kuri social media bigaragaza ko n’ibi bihari bidahagije mu maso ye.

Imikoreshereze ya Social Media mu Rwanda

Perezida Kagame ubwe afite konti ze ku mbuga nkoranyambaga nka Twitter (X) na Facebook, X, na YouTube kandi akunze kugaragara nk’umuyobozi ugezweho ushobora kuvugana n’abaturage ku buryo buhoraho. Ariko imikoreshereze ye ntabwo ikwiye gufatwa gusa nk’ukwerekana ubwisanzure, ahubwo ni uburyo bwo kubaka isura ye mu rwego mpuzamahanga no kugenzura uko abantu bavuga ku Rwanda. Abategetsi benshi b’u Rwanda, za minisiteri, n’amashami ya Leta bifashisha social media mu kwamamaza ibikorwa bya Leta no gusubiza abavuga ibitandukanye. Hari n’igihe bigera ku kwibasira abantu ku giti cyabo cyangwa kubita abanzi b’igihugu.

“Aracyafite ipfunwe”

Iyo Kagame avuga ko abanyarwanda bose bagomba kumufasha gusubiza abamuvugaho, bigaragaza ko n’ubwo afite ubutegetsi bukomeye ku itangazamakuru, ku ngabo, no ku nzego zose z’igihugu, akigaragaza nk’ufite ipfunwe cyangwa ubwoba bw’uko ibyo abantu bavuga bishobora kumuhungabanyiriza isura ndetse n’ibinyoma  ku butegetsi  bwe bukwiza kwiza na Leta ye bukamenyena.

Kuko mu by’ukuri, kuba igihugu gifite ibinyamakuru byose bikorera mu murongo umwe ntibihagije guhagarika ibitekerezo bitandukanye biva hanze. Abanyarwanda bari hanze, impunzi, n’abanyamahanga bakurikiranira hafi ibibera mu Rwanda, bakoresha social media mu gutambutsa ibitekerezo bitandukanye. Ibi bigaragaza impamvu Kagame yifuza ko abaturage bose mu gihugu bifatanya mu buryo bwo “kurwanya” ibyo bitekerezo.

Ingaruka ku Bwisanzure bw’Ibitekerezo

Iyo abaturage basabwa kuba abarinzi b’isura y’umuyobozi aho kuba abafite ubwisanzure bwo kuvuga icyo batekereza, bivuze ko imbuga nkoranyambaga na zo zihinduka ibikoresho bya politiki aho kuba ahantu ho gutanga ibitekerezo bitandukanye. Mu Rwanda, ibi bisanzwe bigaragara kuko hari abaturage benshi batinya kwandika cyangwa kuvuga ibitandukanye na Leta ku mbuga nkoranyambaga, bakaba basigaye bakoresha amazina y’amayoberane cyangwa bakaceceka burundu. Kuba Perezida ubwe asaba buri wese kwinjira muri uwo murongo bigaragaza ko ubwisanzure bwo kuvuga icyo utekereza bukomeza kugabanuka. Ibi ni igitugu kigomba kwamaganwa.

Ubukana mu Kurinda Isura ya Kagame

Mu mateka ya politiki y’u Rwanda, Perezida Kagame yagiye yerekana ko gukemura ibibazo by’ubutegetsi n’amagambo amuvugwaho akenshi bikorwa binyuze mu gukumira cyangwa gutera ubwoba abavuga ibinyuranye. Abantu benshi babaye abanyapolitiki batavuga rumwe na Leta bahunze igihugu, abandi barafungwa, abandi bamwe barishwe mu bihe bitandukanye. Iyi miterere ituma gukoresha social media mu kurinda isura ye bigaragara nk’indi ntambwe mu buryo bwo gukumira icyo ari cyo cyose cyavugwa kitajyanye n’ibyo ubutegetsi bushaka.

Kuki byose Bidahagije?

Kuba Kagame afite ububasha ku binyamakuru byose byo mu gihugu, akagira imbuga ze bwite za social media, ndetse na za serivisi za Leta zose zikora nk’amashami y’ubwamamare ku bikorwa bye, ariko akumva ko ibi byose bidahagije, bigaragaza ibintu bibiri:

1.                       Ubwoba bw’isura mpuzamahanga – Perezida Kagame ahora agerageza kwerekana ko u Rwanda ari igihugu gifite iterambere, umutekano, n’ubuyobozi budasanzwe muri Afurika. Ariko kubera amakuru atandukanye akomeza gutambuka ku bijyanye n’uburenganzira bwa muntu, ubwisanzure bucye, ubukene, n’ubutegetsi bw’igitugu, arashaka uburyo bwo kugenzura ibyo byose no kubisubiza vuba kandi ntibinamenyekane.

2.                       Kwigarurira abaturage – Iyo abaturage bashirwaho igitugu cyo gufatanya mu kurinda isura ya Kagame, bishyirwaho nk’inshingano ya buri wese, bityo bikaba uburyo bwo gukomeza kubaha icyerekezo cya politiki y’igihugu no kubibutsa ko umuyobozi ari we gihugu ubwacyo.

Umusozo

Amagambo ya Perezida Kagame asaba abaturage bose gukoresha social media mu kurengera isura ye agaragaza ko, nubwo afite ubutegetsi bukomeye burangwa n’igitugu, hari ikintu kimubuza amahoro: ipfunwe n’ubwoba bw’uko amakuru atandukanye avugwa hanze ashobora gusenya isura  maze ukuri kuri we no kugihugu bikanyuranya n’ibyo abeshya. Ibi bituma abaturage bahindurwa nk’inkozi z’ibikorwa byo kwamamaza aho kuba abafite ubwisanzure bwo gutanga ibitekerezo.

Mu by’ukuri, ibi byose byerekana ko kugenzura ibinyamakuru, kugira social media bwite, no kugira Leta yose imufasha bitahagije. Kagame akomeza gushaka ko buri muturage yinjira muri uwo murongo, ibintu bigaragaza ipfunwe n’ubwoba by’umuyobozi wumva ko umutekano w’ubutegetsi bwe ushingiye ku kurinda isura ye ku giti cye ko kandi n’ibibi bibera mu gihugu kandi afitemo uruhare bitamenyekana.

Claude  Banyamfura

Rwandan Rights Alliance

 

Joint Management of Areas Occupied by RDF/M23: A Capitulation for the DRC Introduction

 

Joint Management of Areas Occupied by RDF/M23: A Capitulation for the DRC

Introduction

Since 2022, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has faced a new phase of instability following the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23), backed by elements of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF). This rebellion, which Kinshasa considers a creation of Rwanda, has seized several strategic localities in North Kivu, triggering a major humanitarian and security crisis. Within this context, the idea of “joint management” of areas occupied by M23 has emerged in some diplomatic and media circles.

Yet for many Congolese, such a proposition is perceived as an unacceptable capitulation of national sovereignty. Joint management would in practice amount to institutionalising Rwanda’s presence on Congolese soil, via its proxy M23. This raises fundamental questions: does legitimising such an arrangement not deny Rwanda’s central role in this war?

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https://africanrightsalliance.blogspot.com/2025/08/joint-management-of-areas-occupied-by.html

 

La cogestion des zones occupées par le RDF/M23 : une capitulation pour la RDC

Introduction

Depuis 2022, l’est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) traverse une nouvelle phase d’instabilité liée à la résurgence du Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), soutenu par des éléments de l’Armée rwandaise (RDF). Cette rébellion, que Kinshasa considère comme une émanation du Rwanda, a occupé plusieurs localités stratégiques du Nord-Kivu, créant une crise humanitaire et sécuritaire majeure. Dans ce contexte, l’idée d’une « cogestion » de ces zones occupées par le M23 a émergé dans certains cercles diplomatiques et médiatiques.

Or, pour de nombreux Congolais, cette hypothèse est perçue comme une capitulation inacceptable de la souveraineté nationale. La cogestion reviendrait en réalité à institutionnaliser la présence du Rwanda sur le sol congolais, à travers son proxy le M23. Cette approche pose des questions fondamentales : légitimer une telle cogestion, n’est-ce pas nier le rôle central du Rwanda dans cette guerre ? Ne serait-ce pas aussi tourner le dos aux crimes commis par le RDF/M23 contre les populations civiles ?

Cet article examine en profondeur pourquoi la cogestion des zones occupées par le RDF/M23 constituerait une défaite politique et morale pour la RDC, et pourquoi le M23 ne peut revendiquer aucune légitimité à participer à une telle gestion.

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https://africanrightsalliance.blogspot.com/2025/08/la-cogestion-des-zones-occupees-par-le.html

 

Non au fédéralisme imposé : Défendons l’unité du Congo !

Le piège contre Tshisekedi : fédéralisme imposé, Conférence nationale et le spectre d’Arusha

Depuis 2019, Félix Tshisekedi occupe la magistrature suprême de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC). Sa mission est aussi lourde qu’historique : gouverner un pays immense, doté de ressources colossales mais fragilisé par des décennies de conflits et d’ingérences étrangères. Or, à mesure que son mandat avance, une idée revient avec insistance : instaurer un fédéralisme institutionnel.

Certains le présentent comme la clé d’une meilleure gestion des diversités locales. Mais pour d’autres, c’est un piège soigneusement orchestré, aussi bien par des forces internes que par des puissances extérieures, destiné à affaiblir l’État, marginaliser Tshisekedi et ouvrir la voie à la balkanisation du pays.

Cette stratégie rappelle étrangement le précédent rwandais des années 1990, où le président Juvénal Habyarimana, pris au piège des Accords d’Arusha, conserva son titre mais perdit la substance du pouvoir. Une tragédie qui aboutit à son assassinat et à la victoire du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR).

https://africanrightsalliance.blogspot.com/2025/08/non-au-federalisme-impose-defendons.html

Accord de Paix RDC–Rwanda : De la Promesse Diplomatique à la Réalité du Terrain

 

Accord de Paix RDC–Rwanda : De la Promesse Diplomatique à la Réalité du Terrain

 

L’accord de paix du 27 juin 2025 entre la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) et le Rwanda, signé à Washington, a été salué comme une percée historique. Pourtant, deux mois plus tard, ce texte apparaît davantage comme une mise en scène diplomatique qu’une véritable résolution du conflit. S’il a posé des cadres autour de l’intégrité territoriale et de la coopération économique, les réalités militaires sur le terrain n’ont pas changé : les victimes civiles se multiplient et le groupe rebelle M23 a consolidé son contrôle administratif sur les territoires occupés.

More:

https://africanrightsalliance.blogspot.com/2025/08/accord-de-paix-rdcrwanda-de-la-promesse.html

 

The DRC-Rwanda Peace Agreement: From Diplomatic Promise to Ground Reality

Executive Summary

The 27 June 2025 peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, signed in Washington, was heralded as a historic breakthrough. However, two months later, the accord appears to function more as diplomatic theatre than substantive conflict resolution. While the agreement established frameworks for territorial integrity and economic cooperation, military realities on the ground remain unchanged, civilian casualties continue, and the M23 rebel group has consolidated its administrative control over occupied territories.

More:

https://africanrightsalliance.blogspot.com/2025/08/the-drc-rwanda-peace-agreement-from.html

 

The DRC-Rwanda Peace Agreement: From Diplomatic Promise to Ground Reality

Executive Summary

The 27 June 2025 peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, signed in Washington, was heralded as a historic breakthrough. However, two months later, the accord appears to function more as diplomatic theatre than substantive conflict resolution. While the agreement established frameworks for territorial integrity and economic cooperation, military realities on the ground remain unchanged, civilian casualties continue, and the M23 rebel group has consolidated its administrative control over occupied territories.

A "Historic" Agreement on Paper

On  27 June  2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed what was presented as a major breakthrough towards ending hostilities in the eastern DRC. The agreement, made public by the U.S. State Department, outlined commitments to territorial integrity, cessation of support to armed groups, and the establishment of joint mechanisms including supply chain "de-risking" for minerals and cross-border value chain development in partnership with the United States and American investors.

Washington subsequently announced a regional economic framework for the Great Lakes region, designed as a complement to implement the agreement. Diplomatically, the initiative was praised as a "first step" that could open a window for de-escalation.

However, analysts immediately identified significant obstacles: a fragmented war involving over one hundred armed groups (the strongest created and supported by Rwanda), limited inclusion of ground-level actors, and heavy dependence on still-theoretical economic incentives. Congolese observers captured the ambivalence with a telling phrase: "peace on paper, confusion on the ground."

Military Reality Unchanged in the Kivus

While diplomats signed documents in Washington, military maps barely shifted. Successive UN reports (Expert Group reports, Security Council briefings, Secretary-General reports on MONUSCO) document the continued presence and direct support of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF): operational planning, provision of sophisticated weapons, command and control, and deployment of several thousand soldiers inside Congolese territory.

In March 2025, MONUSCO reported a "drastic deterioration" due to renewed M23 offensives "supported by the RDF" and "significant reinforcement" of foreign forces in eastern DRC. In June, the Security Council explicitly urged the RDF to cease all support to M23 and "immediately withdraw" from Congolese territory—a clear indication that despite diplomatic progress, occupation and external support persisted.

The agreement alone did not alter the balance of forces. Ground realities—positions held, supply lines, flows of reinforcements and ammunition—remained determinative, far more than the principles negotiated in Washington.

Continued Atrocities and Humanitarian Crisis

Regarding human rights, the weeks following the signature brought no "tangible de-escalation." On the contrary, Human Rights Watch documented civilian massacres in July 2025, with at least 140 people executed near Virunga National Park, attributed to the "Rwanda-backed M23." In early June, HRW had already reported summary executions of at least 21 civilians in Goma. Amnesty International criticised an agreement that fails to credibly address serious crimes committed in eastern DRC, whilst noting that pro-government Congolese militias have also committed atrocities.

This convergent evidence shows that the signing did not suspend the spiral of violence. This is crucial: a peace agreement that does not quickly and verifiably reduce violence against civilians loses legitimacy in the eyes of affected populations. In the east, displacements number in the millions, humanitarian access remains obstructed, and testimonies report intimidation, extortion, and violence. Meanwhile, mineral pillaging towards Rwanda intensifies.

Parallel Administration: M23 Consolidates Control

One reason the situation remains unchanged is that M23 does not behave like a force in retreat, but as a power in place. Since 2024, and with greater scope in 2025, the UN Expert Group has detailed M23's establishment of parallel administration in controlled zones: forced censuses, proprietary "police," road control, goods taxation, and especially control over the local mining economy. Independent analyses confirm this politico-economic structuring, which aims to make the movement self-financed and legitimise its authority.

The emblematic case is Rubaya, the heart of Congolese coltan production. The UN and journalistic investigations describe how capturing this strategic site allowed M23 to impose substantial "taxes" on traders, generating hundreds of thousands of dollars monthly. Reuters revealed in July 2025 a smuggling scheme involving a Rwandan company buying coltan from rebel-controlled zones, fueling the war machine. Even when Kigali denies all support to M23, the volumes of tantalum exports declared by Rwanda and commercial routes identified by UN experts point to massive "contamination" of regional supply chains.

Reinforcements and Logistics: The War Dynamic Persists

The continued sending of reinforcements by Rwanda to the DRC demonstrates that communication lines and logistical corridors remain open and active. UN and MONUSCO reports covering periods before and after the signing repeatedly mention reinforcements, equipment influx, and maintenance of RDF units operating alongside M23. Leaked confidential reports even mention Rwandan command levels over tactical operations, provision of weapons capable of neutralizing aerial assets, and RDF personnel numbering several thousand on Congolese soil.

As long as these military-logistical parameters are not dismantled, a peace text—however detailed—cannot produce concrete effects. The Security Council had to reiterate in late June the requirement for "unconditional" RDF withdrawal. Again, this post-agreement injunction is an implicit admission: the normalization promised in Washington did not translate into verifiable disengagement.

The Fundamental Flaw: M23 as Rwanda's Proxy Force

The most critical structural limitation of the Washington agreement lies in its treatment of M23 as an independent actor when, in reality, the group is entirely dependent on Rwandan support. Without Rwanda, there would simply be no M23 as an effective fighting force. This dependency relationship makes the agreement's approach fundamentally flawed.

The evidence is overwhelming: M23 exists and operates solely because of sustained Rwandan backing. From military equipment and training to strategic planning and direct troop support, Rwanda provides the essential infrastructure that keeps M23 operational. Under these circumstances, negotiating with Rwanda while treating M23 as a separate entity creates a dangerous fiction that allows Kigali to maintain plausible deniability while continuing its proxy war.

This omission compounds a sequencing flaw: the agreement suggests "simultaneous" approaches (Rwandan withdrawal / FDLR neutralization by the Congolese army). However, as observers noted, many FDLR strongholds are precisely under M23 control, beyond immediate operational reach of the FARDC, making simultaneity very difficult to apply without coercive mechanisms and robust security guarantees.

"Peace" and Minerals: The Ambiguities of an Economic Gamble

The agreement centers on economic integration logic, particularly around strategic minerals (3T and cobalt). The idea: align commercial interests to "secure" eastern DRC and make peace more profitable than war. In theory, this gamble can create positive incentives. In practice, as long as M23 manages a political economy of war—taxes at control points, mining site levies, smuggling circuits via neighboring countries—capital injection and "de-risking" may inadvertently legitimize supply chains captured by armed actors. Analyses highlight the eagerness of certain companies to position themselves on Congolese assets before security materialization, fueling perceptions of peace "serving" mineral access.

The paradox is clear: if the agreement relies primarily on economics, it must simultaneously break the war economy. However, without effective disarmament, corridor control, and credible traceability of 3T and gold flows, the legal economy risks being siphoned by parallel structures that do not lay down arms.

Why Call This a "Cosmetic Act"?

Characterizing Rwanda's Washington signature as a "cosmetic act" points to five blind spots:

1. Absence of Immediate Security Effect

After June 27, no measurable improvement in civilian protection was observed; conversely, massacres were documented in July. A peace agreement that does not interrupt the atrocity cycle—summary executions, sexual violence, mass displacement—remains declaratory.

2. Maintaining Occupation and External Support

RDF presence and operational support to M23 remain a repeated UN finding, necessitating a resolution reiterating withdrawal requirements. As long as these parameters persist, speaking of "de-escalation" is illusory.

3. The Fiction of M23 Independence

The agreement treats M23 as an autonomous actor when it is fundamentally Rwanda's proxy force. This fiction allows Rwanda to sign peace agreements while maintaining its proxy war through M23. Since M23 cannot exist without Rwandan support, any meaningful peace process must directly address Rwanda's control over the group rather than pretending M23 operates independently.

4. Intact War Economy

Control of sites (like Rubaya), flow taxation, structured smuggling toward Rwanda—as long as these rents persist, they finance the war effort and make peace "unprofitable" for armed actors.

5. Inapplicable Sequencing

The simultaneity of "RDF withdrawal / FDLR neutralization" is impractical if FDLR are implanted in M23 territories, inaccessible to FARDC without robust and verifiable security agreements.

From Cosmetic to Concrete: What Would It Take?

For the agreement to cease being perceived as window dressing, five minimum conditions are essential:

Robust and Public Verification Mechanism

Independent geolocation of RDF units and M23 columns, weekly publication of position maps, and automatic sanctions for breaches (asset freezes, travel restrictions, targeted embargoes). Security Council resolutions and Expert Group mandates provide a foundation, but execution and transparency remain key.

Effective Neutralization of War Rents

Customs blockade of corridors, reinforced border post controls, strict "mine-to-metal" certification for tantalum, tin, and tungsten, and prosecution of companies involved in purchasing "captured" minerals. Recent revelations about Rwandan exporters highlight the need to act on commercial, not just military, links.

Supervised M23 Inclusion in DDR Sequence

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration conditioned on security guarantees, without which parallel administration will persist. Parallel mediations (Qatar, regional) should be articulated to the Washington framework with verifiable public milestones.

Immediate Civilian Protection

Security zones, robust patrols, and humanitarian actor support. An agreement's credibility is measured first by the reduction of serious violations, not by announcements of new economic councils.

Withdrawal and State Authority Restitution Schedule

Return of Congolese administration, reopening of public services, local taxation cleanup, and territorial police refoundation under national control. Without this, the "double state" will remain the norm in the east.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Rwanda's signature of the Washington agreement avoided a political diplomatic vacuum and offered a working framework. However, it currently resembles primarily a "cosmetic act": RDF forces are still accused of operating in Congolese territory alongside M23, atrocities continue, parallel administration takes root, and mineral rents finance the war effort.

The agreement has become an "umbrella" providing Rwanda protection against bilateral criticism and sanctions, creating the false impression that Rwanda cooperates for conflict resolution while it continues its proxy war through M23. This is the essence of why the agreement is cosmetic: it allows Rwanda to appear compliant while maintaining complete operational control over M23.

The international community cannot therefore limit itself to applauding an agreement's signature; it must ensure strict application of the latest Security Council resolution demanding immediate, total, and unconditional withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. Failing this, Washington's fine speeches will produce only disappointment and mistrust among Kivu populations.

In this context, a coercive measure becomes unavoidable: establishing an arms embargo against Rwanda. As long as Kigali continues to benefit from weapons flows allowing it to directly or indirectly support M23, resolutions will remain theoretical. The embargo would constitute not only a clear political signal but also a concrete instrument to dry up military interference capacity.

Only a combination of diplomacy, effective sanctions, and intrusive verification mechanisms can transform Washington's cosmetic act into a credible and sustainable peace process for Kivu populations.

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References

• U.S. State Department – "Peace Agreement between DRC and Rwanda" (full text, June 27, 2025) and economic implementation note (August 1, 2025)
• Reuters – Signing coverage: mineral supply chain "de-risking" component (June 27, 2025)
• USIP – "What the DRC-Rwanda Peace Deal Means..." (analysis, July 3, 2025)
• Ebuteli – "Peace on paper, confusion on the ground" (June 27, 2025)
• Boutros-Ghali Observatory – Analysis of simultaneity constraints (July 15, 2025)
• United Nations / Security Council – Expert Group reports and official documents: S/2024/969 (Dec. 27, 2024), S/2025/176 (March 20, 2025), S/2025/202 (April 1, 2025), S/2025/324 (June 2, 2025), associated resolutions
• Reuters – "Rwanda exercises command and control over M23" (July 2, 2025)
• Human Rights Watch – Reports on executions/massacres (June 3, 2025; August 20, 2025)
• Amnesty International – "Peace agreement does not address serious crimes" (July 1, 2025)
• Reuters / Mining investigations – Coltan smuggling, Rwandan company cited (July 3, 2025)
• Supplementary analyses – ISPI (parallel administration), Security Council Report (humanitarian and political context), Understanding War (ceasefire violations)

 

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK

 

Le Rwanda utilise le M23 et les négociations de Doha comme tactiques dilatoires avant la signature finale à Washington

 Le Rwanda utilise le M23 et les négociations de Doha comme tactiques dilatoires avant la signature finale à Washington

Le 27 juin 2025, un accord de paix a été signé à Washington entre la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et le Rwanda, sous l’égide des États-Unis. Présenté comme une avancée historique, ce texte prévoit le retrait des troupes rwandaises, la neutralisation des FDLR, la protection des civils et le respect de la souveraineté congolaise.

Donald Trump, actuel président des États-Unis, n’a pas hésité à présenter cet accord comme la preuve qu’il avait “apporté la paix” au Congo. Pourtant, sur le terrain, rien n’a changé : les combats continuent, le M23 maintient ses positions et les civils continuent de mourir.

 

https://africanrightsalliance.blogspot.com/2025/08/le-rwanda-utilise-le-m23-et-les.html

 

Rwanda Uses M23 and Doha Talks to Stall for Washington Signature

 Rwanda Uses M23 and Doha Talks to Stall for Washington Signature

Despite the fanfare surrounding the fraught peace efforts in eastern DR Congo, troubling patterns are emerging: Rwanda appears to be using the M23 insurgency and Doha peace talks as stalling strategies until a final agreement—with President Kagame and President Tshisekedi in Washington—can be unveiled.

More:

https://africanrightsalliance.blogspot.com/2025/08/rwanda-uses-m23-and-doha-talks-to-stall.html

 

Trump's False Peace

 Trump's False Peace

Donald Trump and Peace in the DRC: A Claim That Hides Reality on the Ground

On June 27, 2025, a peace agreement was signed in Washington between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), under the auspices of the United States. Presented as a major breakthrough, the text was welcomed by many actors, including the US president at the time, Donald Trump. He didn't hesitate to take credit for it, claiming to have "brought peace" to the Congo.

However, this statement is profoundly misleading. Although it represents a diplomatic hope, the Washington agreement has, in fact, changed nothing on the ground. The war continues, the suffering of civilians persists, and instability remains.

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An Agreement on Paper, a War That Continues

The agreement signed in Washington aims to end hostilities in eastern Congo. It contains crucial provisions, including:

• An end to hostile military activities between the two countries.
• The withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC.
• The protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law.
• The disarmament and reintegration of non-state armed groups.

Despite these promises, the reality is completely different. Clashes continue, and reports from the UN and other organizations confirm that the M23, supported by Rwanda, still occupies strategic areas in North Kivu.

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The Reality on the Ground: Suffering and Instability

The consequences of the prolonged conflict are devastating for the Congolese people:

• Massacres of civilians: Atrocities continue. Numerous reports mention killings targeting civilians, often accused of supporting certain armed groups.
• Sexual violence: Rape is still used as a weapon of war, destroying lives and the social fabric of communities.
• Mass displacement: According to the UNHCR, more than 7 million Congolese are internally displaced, a global record.
• Pillaging of resources: Mines under the control of armed groups continue to fuel an illicit trade in minerals. These resources finance the conflict, creating a vicious cycle of violence and exploitation.

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The Weaknesses of a Symbolic Agreement

If the Washington agreement has not ended the conflict, it's partly because of its shortcomings:

1. Lack of a binding mechanism: The text provides for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, but without a specific timetable or sanctions for non-compliance. Rwanda has no incentive to abide by its obligations.
2. A biased narrative: By focusing on the threat posed by the FDLR, a group of a few hundred fighters that no longer represents a strategic threat, the agreement minimizes the role of Rwandan aggression. This approach diverts attention from the root causes of the conflict.
3. Disguised "co-management": By talking about the integration of armed groups, the agreement seems to open the door to potential co-management of the areas occupied by the M23. Such a measure would risk institutionalizing the occupation and threatening the territorial integrity of the DRC.

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Trump's Discourse: A Dangerous Claim

When Donald Trump claims that the agreement has brought peace, he is making a political statement that conceals a brutal reality. This claim has three harmful effects:

• It makes the victims invisible: By celebrating a peace that does not exist, he erases the suffering of millions of Congolese people.
• It reinforces impunity: This discourse gives a diplomatic cover to Rwanda, allowing it to continue its military operations without fear of international sanctions.
• It weakens the DRC: Congolese diplomacy finds itself isolated in the face of an international narrative that doesn't reflect the truth on the ground.

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Conclusion: What the Congolese People Want

The Congolese people don't want a superficial agreement. They demand a firm commitment based on truth and justice. They want:

• A total and effective withdrawal of Rwanda and the M23.
• An end to the pillaging of natural resources.
• International justice for war crimes.
• Real humanitarian aid and protection for displaced civilians.

Lasting peace won't be built on slogans or political statements. It will depend on truth, justice, and the commitment of the international community to enforce international law. Donald Trump's claim, far from bringing peace, has primarily offered Rwanda a diplomatic umbrella to continue its actions. The Congo doesn't need lies; it needs genuine international solidarity and concrete action.

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi &  Gilberte  Bienvenue

African  Rights Alliance