Executive Summary
The 27 June 2025 peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, signed in Washington, was heralded as a historic
breakthrough. However, two months later, the accord appears to function more as
diplomatic theatre than substantive conflict resolution. While the agreement
established frameworks for territorial integrity and economic cooperation,
military realities on the ground remain unchanged, civilian casualties
continue, and the M23 rebel group has consolidated its administrative control
over occupied territories.
A "Historic" Agreement on Paper
On 27 June 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed what was
presented as a major breakthrough towards ending hostilities in the eastern
DRC. The agreement, made public by the U.S. State Department, outlined
commitments to territorial integrity, cessation of support to armed groups, and
the establishment of joint mechanisms including supply chain
"de-risking" for minerals and cross-border value chain development in
partnership with the United States and American investors.
Washington subsequently announced a regional economic framework for the
Great Lakes region, designed as a complement to implement the agreement.
Diplomatically, the initiative was praised as a "first step" that
could open a window for de-escalation.
However, analysts immediately identified significant obstacles: a
fragmented war involving over one hundred armed groups (the strongest created
and supported by Rwanda), limited inclusion of ground-level actors, and heavy
dependence on still-theoretical economic incentives. Congolese observers
captured the ambivalence with a telling phrase: "peace on paper, confusion
on the ground."
Military Reality Unchanged in the Kivus
While diplomats signed documents in Washington, military maps barely
shifted. Successive UN reports (Expert Group reports, Security Council
briefings, Secretary-General reports on MONUSCO) document the continued
presence and direct support of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF): operational
planning, provision of sophisticated weapons, command and control, and
deployment of several thousand soldiers inside Congolese territory.
In March 2025, MONUSCO reported a "drastic deterioration" due
to renewed M23 offensives "supported by the RDF" and
"significant reinforcement" of foreign forces in eastern DRC. In
June, the Security Council explicitly urged the RDF to cease all support to M23
and "immediately withdraw" from Congolese territory—a clear
indication that despite diplomatic progress, occupation and external support
persisted.
The agreement alone did not alter the balance of forces. Ground
realities—positions held, supply lines, flows of reinforcements and
ammunition—remained determinative, far more than the principles negotiated in
Washington.
Continued Atrocities and Humanitarian Crisis
Regarding human rights, the weeks following the signature brought no
"tangible de-escalation." On the contrary, Human Rights Watch
documented civilian massacres in July 2025, with at least 140 people executed
near Virunga National Park, attributed to the "Rwanda-backed M23." In
early June, HRW had already reported summary executions of at least 21
civilians in Goma. Amnesty International criticised an agreement that fails to
credibly address serious crimes committed in eastern DRC, whilst noting that
pro-government Congolese militias have also committed atrocities.
This convergent evidence shows that the signing did not suspend the
spiral of violence. This is crucial: a peace agreement that does not quickly
and verifiably reduce violence against civilians loses legitimacy in the eyes
of affected populations. In the east, displacements number in the millions,
humanitarian access remains obstructed, and testimonies report intimidation,
extortion, and violence. Meanwhile, mineral pillaging towards Rwanda
intensifies.
Parallel Administration: M23 Consolidates
Control
One reason the situation remains unchanged is that M23 does not behave
like a force in retreat, but as a power in place. Since 2024, and with greater
scope in 2025, the UN Expert Group has detailed M23's establishment of parallel
administration in controlled zones: forced censuses, proprietary
"police," road control, goods taxation, and especially control over
the local mining economy. Independent analyses confirm this politico-economic
structuring, which aims to make the movement self-financed and legitimise its
authority.
The emblematic case is Rubaya, the heart of Congolese coltan production.
The UN and journalistic investigations describe how capturing this strategic
site allowed M23 to impose substantial "taxes" on traders, generating
hundreds of thousands of dollars monthly. Reuters revealed in July 2025 a
smuggling scheme involving a Rwandan company buying coltan from
rebel-controlled zones, fueling the war machine. Even when Kigali denies all
support to M23, the volumes of tantalum exports declared by Rwanda and commercial
routes identified by UN experts point to massive "contamination" of
regional supply chains.
Reinforcements and Logistics: The War Dynamic
Persists
The continued sending of reinforcements by Rwanda to the DRC
demonstrates that communication lines and logistical corridors remain open and
active. UN and MONUSCO reports covering periods before and after the signing
repeatedly mention reinforcements, equipment influx, and maintenance of RDF
units operating alongside M23. Leaked confidential reports even mention Rwandan
command levels over tactical operations, provision of weapons capable of
neutralizing aerial assets, and RDF personnel numbering several thousand on
Congolese soil.
As long as these military-logistical parameters are not dismantled, a
peace text—however detailed—cannot produce concrete effects. The Security
Council had to reiterate in late June the requirement for
"unconditional" RDF withdrawal. Again, this post-agreement injunction
is an implicit admission: the normalization promised in Washington did not
translate into verifiable disengagement.
The Fundamental Flaw: M23 as Rwanda's Proxy
Force
The most critical structural limitation of the Washington agreement lies
in its treatment of M23 as an independent actor when, in reality, the group is
entirely dependent on Rwandan support. Without Rwanda, there would simply be no
M23 as an effective fighting force. This dependency relationship makes the
agreement's approach fundamentally flawed.
The evidence is overwhelming: M23 exists and operates solely because of
sustained Rwandan backing. From military equipment and training to strategic
planning and direct troop support, Rwanda provides the essential infrastructure
that keeps M23 operational. Under these circumstances, negotiating with Rwanda
while treating M23 as a separate entity creates a dangerous fiction that allows
Kigali to maintain plausible deniability while continuing its proxy war.
This omission compounds a sequencing flaw: the agreement suggests
"simultaneous" approaches (Rwandan withdrawal / FDLR neutralization
by the Congolese army). However, as observers noted, many FDLR strongholds are
precisely under M23 control, beyond immediate operational reach of the FARDC,
making simultaneity very difficult to apply without coercive mechanisms and
robust security guarantees.
"Peace" and Minerals: The
Ambiguities of an Economic Gamble
The agreement centers on economic integration logic, particularly around
strategic minerals (3T and cobalt). The idea: align commercial interests to
"secure" eastern DRC and make peace more profitable than war. In
theory, this gamble can create positive incentives. In practice, as long as M23
manages a political economy of war—taxes at control points, mining site levies,
smuggling circuits via neighboring countries—capital injection and
"de-risking" may inadvertently legitimize supply chains captured by
armed actors. Analyses highlight the eagerness of certain companies to position
themselves on Congolese assets before security materialization, fueling
perceptions of peace "serving" mineral access.
The paradox is clear: if the agreement relies primarily on economics, it
must simultaneously break the war economy. However, without effective
disarmament, corridor control, and credible traceability of 3T and gold flows,
the legal economy risks being siphoned by parallel structures that do not lay
down arms.
Why Call This a "Cosmetic Act"?
Characterizing Rwanda's Washington signature as a "cosmetic
act" points to five blind spots:
1. Absence of Immediate Security Effect
After June 27, no measurable improvement in civilian protection was
observed; conversely, massacres were documented in July. A peace agreement that
does not interrupt the atrocity cycle—summary executions, sexual violence, mass
displacement—remains declaratory.
2. Maintaining Occupation and External Support
RDF presence and operational support to M23 remain a repeated UN
finding, necessitating a resolution reiterating withdrawal requirements. As
long as these parameters persist, speaking of "de-escalation" is
illusory.
3. The Fiction of M23 Independence
The agreement treats M23 as an autonomous actor when it is fundamentally
Rwanda's proxy force. This fiction allows Rwanda to sign peace agreements while
maintaining its proxy war through M23. Since M23 cannot exist without Rwandan
support, any meaningful peace process must directly address Rwanda's control
over the group rather than pretending M23 operates independently.
4. Intact War Economy
Control of sites (like Rubaya), flow taxation, structured smuggling
toward Rwanda—as long as these rents persist, they finance the war effort and
make peace "unprofitable" for armed actors.
5. Inapplicable Sequencing
The simultaneity of "RDF withdrawal / FDLR neutralization" is
impractical if FDLR are implanted in M23 territories, inaccessible to FARDC
without robust and verifiable security agreements.
From Cosmetic to Concrete: What Would It Take?
For the agreement to cease being perceived as window dressing, five
minimum conditions are essential:
Robust and Public Verification Mechanism
Independent geolocation of RDF units and M23 columns, weekly publication
of position maps, and automatic sanctions for breaches (asset freezes, travel
restrictions, targeted embargoes). Security Council resolutions and Expert
Group mandates provide a foundation, but execution and transparency remain key.
Effective Neutralization of War Rents
Customs blockade of corridors, reinforced border post controls, strict
"mine-to-metal" certification for tantalum, tin, and tungsten, and
prosecution of companies involved in purchasing "captured" minerals.
Recent revelations about Rwandan exporters highlight the need to act on
commercial, not just military, links.
Supervised M23 Inclusion in DDR Sequence
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration conditioned on security
guarantees, without which parallel administration will persist. Parallel
mediations (Qatar, regional) should be articulated to the Washington framework
with verifiable public milestones.
Immediate Civilian Protection
Security zones, robust patrols, and humanitarian actor support. An
agreement's credibility is measured first by the reduction of serious
violations, not by announcements of new economic councils.
Withdrawal and State Authority Restitution
Schedule
Return of Congolese administration, reopening of public services, local
taxation cleanup, and territorial police refoundation under national control.
Without this, the "double state" will remain the norm in the east.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Rwanda's signature of the Washington agreement avoided a political
diplomatic vacuum and offered a working framework. However, it currently
resembles primarily a "cosmetic act": RDF forces are still accused of
operating in Congolese territory alongside M23, atrocities continue, parallel
administration takes root, and mineral rents finance the war effort.
The agreement has become an "umbrella" providing Rwanda
protection against bilateral criticism and sanctions, creating the false
impression that Rwanda cooperates for conflict resolution while it continues
its proxy war through M23. This is the essence of why the agreement is
cosmetic: it allows Rwanda to appear compliant while maintaining complete
operational control over M23.
The international community cannot therefore limit itself to applauding
an agreement's signature; it must ensure strict application of the latest
Security Council resolution demanding immediate, total, and unconditional
withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. Failing this,
Washington's fine speeches will produce only disappointment and mistrust among
Kivu populations.
In this context, a coercive measure becomes unavoidable: establishing an
arms embargo against Rwanda. As long as Kigali continues to benefit from
weapons flows allowing it to directly or indirectly support M23, resolutions
will remain theoretical. The embargo would constitute not only a clear
political signal but also a concrete instrument to dry up military interference
capacity.
Only a combination of diplomacy, effective sanctions, and intrusive
verification mechanisms can transform Washington's cosmetic act into a credible
and sustainable peace process for Kivu populations.
References
- U.S.
State Department – "Peace Agreement between DRC and Rwanda"
(full text, June 27, 2025) and economic implementation note (August 1,
2025)
- Reuters
– Signing coverage: mineral supply chain "de-risking" component
(June 27, 2025)
- USIP –
"What the DRC-Rwanda Peace Deal Means..." (analysis, July 3,
2025)
- Ebuteli
– "Peace on paper, confusion on the ground" (June 27, 2025)
- Boutros-Ghali
Observatory – Analysis of simultaneity constraints (July 15, 2025)
- United
Nations / Security Council – Expert Group reports and official documents:
S/2024/969 (Dec. 27, 2024), S/2025/176 (March 20, 2025), S/2025/202 (April
1, 2025), S/2025/324 (June 2, 2025), associated resolutions
- Reuters
– "Rwanda exercises command and control over M23" (July 2, 2025)
- Human
Rights Watch – Reports on executions/massacres (June 3, 2025; August 20,
2025)
- Amnesty
International – "Peace agreement does not address serious
crimes" (July 1, 2025)
- Reuters
/ Mining investigations – Coltan smuggling, Rwandan company cited (July 3,
2025)
- Supplementary
analyses – ISPI (parallel administration), Security Council Report
(humanitarian and political context), Understanding War (ceasefire
violations)
Prepared par :
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson &
Gilberte Bienvenue
African Rights Alliance, London, UK
