Kagame Deceived the Deputies, the Rwandan People, and the International Community:

A Detailed Analysis of Paul Kagame's Statements and His Repeated Violations of Peace Agreements**

Today, 11 December 2025, Paul Kagame openly admitted before Members of Parliament that Rwanda/M23 had launched hostilities and begun the capture of Uvira even before he travelled to sign the Washington Agreements. He added that the fighting continued while he was signing the agreements and is still ongoing today.
No one knew this: only Kagame and his military units were aware of the clandestine offensive, consistent with a pattern of strategic secrecy that has been repeatedly documented.

Kagame acknowledged that he went to sign the agreements while he had just ordered the offensive on Uvira, and that those with whom he was signing had been given no information, preventing them from raising any objections because they simply did not know.
This pattern of concealment mirrors what has been repeatedly reported in UN Group of Experts reports on Rwanda's covert military involvement in eastern DRC (2012, 2013, 2022, 2023).

He also admitted he was personally involved in the war for the capture of Uvira, while the international community believed a ceasefire was in place under the Doha Agreements.
His hidden offensive continued even as he was signing the Washington Agreements.

These admissions confirm a consistent historical pattern: Kagame never respects the agreements he signs, a behaviour already observed during the Arusha Peace Accords (1993) and throughout subsequent regional crises.

1. The Uvira Offensive Was Planned Before the Signing of the Agreements

Kagame acknowledged that the capture of Uvira was a premeditated military operation, not a spontaneous event.
This behaviour aligns with the modus operandi described in multiple UN reports documenting Rwanda's covert planning of M23's actions prior to any formal announcements (UN Group of Experts, S/2012/843).

Thus, while signing the Washington Agreements, Kagame knew that:

• the peace commitments he was signing would not be honoured,

• military operations were already underway,

• he was engaging in a deliberate deception of international mediators.

Such behaviour mirrors previous violations, including Rwanda's disregard for the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

2. He Signed the Agreements While Lying About the Absence of Fighting

Kagame's own statements reveal that:

• international representatives at the signing ceremony were given no information about Rwanda/M23's ongoing military operations;

• despite the agreements requiring an immediate halt to hostilities, he signed knowing that the war was continuing and that Uvira was under assault.

This constitutes:

• diplomatic fraud,

• a severe breach of trust,

• a violation of international law, which demands good faith, transparency, and honesty in peace negotiations.

Similar patterns of deception have been condemned by:

• UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013),

• UN Group of Experts reports (2022–2023) confirming Rwanda's direct military oversight of M23,

• Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, which have repeatedly documented Kigali's use of disinformation to advance military objectives.

3. Continuing the War While Signing the Agreements Constitutes a Deliberate Violation

Kagame admitted that the fighting continued while he signed the agreements. This demonstrates:

• complete disrespect for the Washington Agreements,

• no intention whatsoever to comply,

• a deliberate effort to mislead the international community into believing a peace process was underway while military operations continued.

Launching a war in secrecy while signing a peace agreement is:

• political manipulation,

• diplomatic deception,

• and a form of military cowardice.

Under international law, any party that signs an agreement while:

• hiding essential information,

• lying, or

• continuing hostilities,

is considered to have intentionally violated the agreement.

This constitutes a deliberate violation of a peace agreement through deception.

4. Kagame Never Respects Agreements: The Precedent of the Arusha Accords

The violation of the Washington Agreements fits within a long-established pattern.
The Arusha Peace Accords (1993) provide the clearest historical example of Kagame's systematic refusal to honour agreements.

Key references:

• Arusha Peace Accords (1993): Kagame and the RPF committed to power-sharing and integration into a transitional government.

• ICTR findings: despite signing, the RPF continued military preparations and violated ceasefire commitments.

• Scholarly research by Filip Reyntjens, Allan Stam, Christian Davenport: the RPF used negotiations as cover while preparing a military takeover.

• French judicial investigations (Bruguière, 2006; Trévidic, 2010) point to strong indications of RPF involvement in the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana.

The downing of Habyarimana's plane — described in many analyses as the decisive act by which the RPF destroyed the Arusha Accords — triggered the collapse of the peace process.

Thus, violating the Washington Agreements is not an anomaly.
It is part of a long-term strategic doctrine based on:

1. signing agreements to reassure the international community,

2. continuing military preparations in secret,

3. sabotaging negotiations internally,

4. creating confusion,

5. using military advantage once the world has been deceived.

5. Legal and Political Consequences

Despite claiming he respected the Washington Agreements, Kagame's admissions show:

• he breached the principle of good faith,

• launched a military offensive during peace talks,

• deliberately misled negotiators,

• signed commitments he knew were invalidated by his actions.

International law defines this behaviour as a deliberate violation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, including:

• Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,

• internationally accepted norms of good-faith negotiation.

His conduct represents the intentional destruction of the agreements.

6. What Kagame Is Preparing Now

After the capture of Uvira:

• he will immediately request a ceasefire,

• he will pressure Qatar to restart negotiations between Rwanda/M23 and the DRC,

• the DRC will be forced to accept due to lack of alternatives,

• Kigali will control both the rhythm of the war and the negotiation timetable.

This pattern is identical to what appears in:

• UN Group of Experts reports (2012–2023),

• International Crisis Group analyses,

• EU reports on the destabilisation of the Kivu region.

This is a never-ending cycle, and the DRC will remain trapped as long as the international community fails to recognise the systematic nature of Kagame's strategy.

Primary References

1. United Nations – Group of Experts on the DRC: Reports 2012, 2013, 2022, 2023.

2. United Nations – DRC Mapping Report (2010).

3. UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013).

4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 26.

5. Arusha Peace Accords (1993).

6. ICTR reports and findings (1993–1994).

7. Bruguière Report (2006) and Trévidic investigations (2010).

8. Reyntjens, F. – Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda.

9. Davenport & Stam – Rwanda: What Really Happened.

10. Human Rights Watch – Reports on Rwanda and M23 (1994–2023).

11. Amnesty International – Reports on eastern DRC and Rwandan involvement.

Kagame a trompé les Députés, les Rwandais et la communauté internationale :

Analyse approfondie des déclarations de Paul Kagame et de la violation répétée des accords de paix

Aujourd'hui le 11/12/2025, Paul Kagame a lui-même déclaré devant les Députés que le Rwanda/M23 avaient lancé les hostilités et entamé la prise d'Uvira avant son départ pour signer les Accords de Washington. Il a ajouté que les combats se poursuivaient pendant la signature et continuent encore à ce jour.
Personne ne le savait : seul Kagame et ses unités militaires en étaient informés, conformément à son mode opératoire de dissimulation militaire régulièrement documenté.

Kagame reconnaît qu'il est allé signer les accords alors qu'il venait d'ordonner l'offensive sur Uvira, et que ceux avec qui il signait n'avaient reçu aucune information, les empêchant ainsi d'exprimer la moindre objection.
Ce schéma de dissimulation correspond aux tactiques relevées dans plusieurs rapports d'experts des Nations unies, notamment lorsqu'il s'agit d'opérations coordonnées par le Rwanda dans l'Est de la RDC (Voir : UN Group of Experts on the DRC, rapports 2012, 2013, 2022, 2023).

Il avoue également avoir été directement impliqué dans la guerre, alors que la communauté internationale pensait au maintien d'un cessez-le-feu issu des Accords de Doha.

Ces aveux confirment un comportement historique et répété : Kagame ne respecte jamais les accords qu'il signe, ce qui nous amène à un schéma observé depuis les Accords d'Arusha (1993).

1. L'offensive sur Uvira était planifiée avant la signature des accords

Kagame admet que la prise d'Uvira était une opération préméditée.
Ce comportement est conforme au modus operandi décrit dans les rapports de l'ONU sur les interventions rwandaises dans l'Est du Congo. Les experts avaient documenté, déjà en 2012, que le Rwanda préparait secrètement les opérations du M23 avant toute annonce officielle (UN Group of Experts, S/2012/843).

Ainsi, lorsqu'il se trouvait à Washington, Kagame savait que :

• ce qu'il signait n'avait aucune valeur pour lui,

• les opérations militaires étaient déjà en cours,

• un mensonge délibéré était en train d'être commis à la face du monde.

Un tel comportement a déjà été observé à de nombreuses reprises, notamment lors des Accords de cessez-le-feu de Lusaka (1999) que Kigali avait également violés.

2. Il a signé les accords en mentant sur l'absence de combats

Les déclarations de Kagame prouvent que :

• les délégués internationaux n'avaient reçu aucune information sur les offensives en cours,

• les engagements de cessez-le-feu étaient délibérément bafoués,

• le Rwanda utilisait encore une fois la diplomatie comme couverture politique pour des opérations militaires.

Des pratiques similaires ont été dénoncées dans :

• la Résolution 2098 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité, condamnant les soutiens extérieurs au M23,

• les rapports 2022 et 2023 du Groupe d'experts, confirmant que des officiers rwandais supervisaient directement les opérations du M23,

• Human Rights Watch et Amnesty International, accusant régulièrement Kigali d'utiliser la désinformation militaire pour faciliter des offensives.

• Il s'agit d'un acte de tromperie diplomatique majeur.

3. Poursuivre la guerre pendant la signature constitue une violation délibérée

Kagame reconnaît que les combats se poursuivaient pendant la signature. Ce comportement est une violation directe du droit international, en particulier :

• l'Article 26 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités (pacta sunt servanda),

• l'obligation de bonne foi dans les processus de paix,

• la règle fondamentale interdisant la tromperie volontaire lors de négociations officielles.

Cette stratégie a été observée à plusieurs reprises dans l'histoire du FPR.
Le rapport Mapping Report des Nations unies (2010) décrit en détail l'utilisation par le FPR :

• de la dissimulation,

• de la ruse militaire,

• et du contournement des engagements signés.

4. Kagame ne respecte jamais les accords : le précédent des Accords d'Arusha

Les Accords d'Arusha (1993) sont le premier exemple majeur de non-respect des accords de paix par Kagame.

Références essentielles :

• Accords d'Arusha pour la Paix au Rwanda (1993) : engagement formel au partage du pouvoir et à l'intégration des forces.

• Rapport de l'ICTR (Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda) : le FPR a continué les hostilités malgré le cessez-le-feu.

• Rapports de chercheurs comme Filip Reyntjens, Allan Stam et Christian Davenport : le FPR utilisait les négociations comme couverture pour préparer une prise de pouvoir militaire.

• Expertise technique du juge Bruguière (2006) et du juge Trévidic (2010) : pistes sérieuses sur l'implication du FPR dans l'attentat contre l'avion du président Habyarimana.

L'assassinat du président Habyarimana — événement qui a fait voler en éclats les accords — est décrit dans plusieurs analyses comme l'acte clé par lequel le FPR a détruit Arusha pour imposer la solution militaire.

Ainsi, violer les Accords de Washington n'est pas un accident :
c'est la continuité d'un modèle de gouvernance basé sur la dissimulation, la manipulation diplomatique et la violence politique.

5. Conséquences juridiques et politiques

Même si Kagame nie la violation des accords, ses propres déclarations prouvent :

• qu'il a violé le principe de bonne foi,

• qu'il a lancé une offensive pendant un processus de paix,

• qu'il a trompé les médiateurs internationaux,

• et qu'il a transformé les Accords de Washington en simple outil stratégique.

Ce comportement correspond à une violation délibérée d'un cessez-le-feu (Vienne, Art. 26), mais aussi à ce que le droit international qualifie de :
tromperie institutionnalisée dans un cadre de négociation de paix.

6. Ce que Kagame prépare maintenant

Après la prise d'Uvira :

• il demandera un cessez-le-feu,

• il forcera une reprise des négociations (sous médiation du Qatar),

• la RDC n'aura pas d'autre choix que d'accepter,

• Kigali continuera à gérer simultanément les opérations militaires et la diplomatie.

Ce schéma est identique à celui observé dans :

• le rapport du Groupe d'experts de l'ONU (2012) sur le soutien du Rwanda au M23,

• les analyses de l'International Crisis Group,

• les rapports de l'Union européenne sur l'instabilité du Kivu.

Il s'agit d'un cycle sans fin, dans lequel la RDC risque de rester piégée tant que la communauté internationale ne reconnaîtra pas la nature systémique de cette stratégie.

Références principales

1. Nations unies – Groupe d'experts sur la RDC : rapports 2012, 2013, 2022, 2023.

2. Nations unies – Mapping Report (2010).

3. CST – Conseil de sécurité : Résolution 2098 (2013).

4. Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités (1969), Article 26.

5. Accords d'Arusha pour la Paix au Rwanda (1993).

6. ICTR – Conclusions et rapports sur la période de 1993–1994.

7. Bruguière, J. – Rapport d'instruction sur l'attentat du 6 avril 1994 (2006).

8. Trévidic, M. – Conclusions techniques sur l'attentat du Falcon 50 (2010).

9. Reyntjens, F. – Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda.

10. Davenport, C. & Stam, A. – Rwanda: What Really Happened (analyse quantitative).

11. Human Rights Watch – Rapports 1994–2023 sur les opérations du FPR et du M23.

12. Amnesty International – Rapports sur le Congo oriental et les interventions rwandaises.

Diplomacy as a Weapon: How M23/RDF Offensives Intensify When Kagame and Tshisekedi Travel Abroad

Diplomacy as a Weapon: How M23/RDF Offensives Intensify When Kagame and Tshisekedi Travel Abroad – and the Disguised Attitudes of Kagame That Everyone Knows Yet Few Dare to Confront

For more than two decades, the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has unfolded within a web of geopolitical manoeuvres, military strategies, diplomatic theatrics, and narratives designed to obscure responsibilities. At the centre of this complex landscape lies a phenomenon observed repeatedly by international researchers, UN investigators, diplomats, journalists, and Congolese civilians alike: M23 offensives — supported, according to numerous United Nations reports, by the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) — intensify precisely when Rwanda's President Paul Kagame travels abroad.

A second, equally troubling dynamic has emerged in recent years: M23/RDF offensives also escalate when DRC President Félix Tshisekedi travels abroad, whether for diplomatic missions, regional summits, or bilateral engagements. These patterns are not accidental. They form part of a deliberate, multi-layered strategy in which diplomacy, political timing, and military opportunism are woven together to maximise Rwanda's influence while weakening the Congolese state.

But beneath this strategy lies something deeper: the disguised attitudes of Paul Kagame — an overt denial of involvement in Congo's war, wrapped in polished diplomacy — attitudes that everyone recognises yet few governments confront openly. This dual reality defines one of the most cynical geopolitical crises of the modern African continent.

This 3,000-word document analyses the phenomenon through three dimensions:

1. The intensification of M23/RDF operations during Kagame's travels, and what this reveals about Rwanda's military structure.
2. The escalation of attacks during Tshisekedi's foreign missions and what this exposes about Congo's institutional vulnerabilities.
3. Kagame's disguised attitude — a posture of denial known to all but challenged by almost none — and how it shapes international responses.

I. When Kagame Travels, M23 Attacks Intensify: The Anatomy of a Strategic Pattern

1. A pattern too consistent to ignore

Since the re-emergence of the M23 rebel movement in 2012 — and especially since its resurgence in 2021 — investigators have noticed a recurring pattern: whenever Paul Kagame travels abroad, M23 offensives in eastern Congo intensify noticeably.

These escalations are not random. They involve:

• the capture of strategic towns,
• the cutting of major supply routes,
• coordinated assaults on FARDC positions,
• heightened use of military drones,
• and systematic displacement of civilians.

The timing is so consistent that it has become a geopolitical indicator in itself:
Kagame in Europe or the US → M23 gains ground in North Kivu.

2. Rwanda's military structure does not depend on Kagame's physical presence

Military analysts emphasise a crucial point: Kagame does not need to be in Rwanda for the RDF-M23 machinery to operate. Rwanda's military structure is:

• highly centralised,
• rigidly disciplined,
• extremely loyal to Kagame,
• and fully capable of executing pre-defined strategies autonomously.

Decisions made at the highest level flow down a narrow, controlled chain of command. Once orders and strategic objectives are set, operations proceed without interruption — whether Kagame is in Kigali, Doha, Washington, or Paris.

Thus, the intensification of attacks during Kagame's travels does not imply that he is directing operations from an aircraft or hotel room minute by minute. Rather, it demonstrates that:

The Rwandan military system supporting the M23 remains fully active, organised, and aligned with Kagame's strategic vision, even in his physical absence.

3. Kagame's foreign trips serve as political camouflage

One of the most revealing — and disturbing — aspects of this pattern is how Kagame's foreign missions offer him a convenient political shield. When he is seen on the world stage:

• speaking about peace and stability,
• advocating for African unity,
• condemning insecurity in the region,
• or promoting Rwanda as a model of progress,

it becomes easier for him to deny any involvement in the simultaneous military escalation in Congo.

It is a simple but effective tactic:
being elsewhere to deny involvement at home.

Diplomatically, this façade is powerful. Kagame presents himself as a responsible statesman while the RDF-supported M23 expands its territorial control.

4. Kagame's disguised attitude — known to all, confronted by none

Paul Kagame's public posture regarding the Congo war follows a predictable script:

• He denies any Rwandan involvement.
• He dismisses UN reports as politically biased.
• He blames the FDLR for all instability.
• He portrays Rwanda as a misunderstood victim.
• He accuses Congo of failing to govern itself.

Yet behind closed doors, diplomats and international analysts acknowledge a very different truth:
Everyone knows Rwanda is deeply involved. Everyone knows the M23 is not an independent movement. Everyone knows the RDF supplies, trains, and sometimes directly commands its fighters.

Kagame's disguised attitude is therefore not ignorance — it is performance.
A diplomatic show.
A calculated fiction.
A mask worn deliberately because he knows the world will not challenge him seriously.

His confidence in this impunity has become part of the strategy itself.

II. When Tshisekedi Travels, M23 Makes Gains: Exploiting Congo's Structural Vulnerabilities

1. A military apparatus dependent on presidential presence

Unlike Rwanda's disciplined and vertical military, the FARDC suffers from:

• chronic underfunding,
• weak logistics,
• corruption,
• internal rivalries,
• lack of unified command,
• infiltration by foreign interests.

In such an environment, President Tshisekedi's presence is more than symbolic — it is operational. His role is crucial for:

• consolidating command structures,
• accelerating decision-making,
• coordinating political-military responses,
• maintaining pressure on senior officers.

When Tshisekedi travels abroad, the cohesion of the military apparatus weakens.

2. M23/RDF offensives intensify during these absences

M23/RDF commanders appear to understand this vulnerability perfectly. UN investigations document rapid advances of the rebel movement during periods when Tshisekedi is abroad, including:

• major assaults on FARDC positions,
• coordinated offensives targeting weakened sectors,
• seizing of towns and villages with minimal resistance,
• encirclement of strategic areas.

Examples include offensives around:

• Bunagana,
• Rutshuru,
• Tongo,
• Kishishe,
• Nyanzale,
• Mweso.

These attacks were not spontaneous but planned to coincide with moments when the Congolese political machine — already strained — becomes even less responsive.

3. A dual exploitation: Rwanda's strength vs. Congo's vulnerabilities

The contrast between the two states explains the strategic timing:

• Rwanda's system is so centralised that Kagame's absence changes nothing.
• Congo's system is so fragile that Tshisekedi's absence changes everything.

Thus, M23/RDF exploits:

• Kagame's travel as diplomatic cover,
• Tshisekedi's travel as an operational opening.

This dual mechanism allows the rebel movement to expand territorial control while avoiding immediate political consequences.

III. Kagame's Disguised Attitude: A Global Secret That Few Governments Dare Expose

1. Denial as a tool of statecraft

Kagame's behaviour in relation to Congo follows a well-crafted diplomatic choreography:

1. Deny everything.
2. Blame the FDLR.
3. Frame Rwanda as a victim.
4. Present Congo as irresponsible and chaotic.
5. Accuse UN experts of bias.
6. Promote Rwanda's image as disciplined and modern.

This formula has allowed him to maintain international partnerships, attract massive aid, and preserve his global reputation — even while international reports identify Rwanda as a destabilising force.

2. Everyone knows — and yet silence prevails

In diplomatic circles:

• ambassadors know,
• African Union officials know,
• UN representatives know,
• Western intelligence services know,
• humanitarian organisations know,
• Congolese civilians know intimately.

It is an open secret that Rwanda supports the M23.
But geopolitics — interests, alliances, minerals, military cooperation — prevents open condemnation.

Thus, Kagame's disguised attitude persists because it is politically convenient for powerful actors to look the other way.

3. Impunity as a strategic weapon

The absence of meaningful consequences emboldens the pattern:

• Offensives intensify.
• Rwanda denies involvement.
• The international community hesitates.
• The cycle repeats.

Kagame has understood that in a world driven by interests, denial is often as effective as truth, especially when backed by military power, economic networks, and control of narrative.

Conclusion: A War Fought in Three Arenas

The conflict in eastern Congo is not merely a battlefield confrontation. It is a multi-dimensional geopolitical struggle fought simultaneously across:

1. The diplomatic arena

Where Kagame uses foreign travel as political camouflage and Tshisekedi attempts to rally international support.

2. The institutional arena

Where Rwanda's disciplined system contrasts sharply with Congo's fragile military structures.

3. The psychological arena

Where Kagame's disguised attitudes — known to all, confronted by none — sustain a climate of impunity that enables the continuation of violence.

Understanding these layers is essential for any meaningful peace strategy.

References

• United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC (reports: 2012, 2013, 2014, 2018, 2022, 2023).
• Report S/2022/479 – Evidence of RDF involvement in M23 operations.
• Report S/2023/573 – Documentation of logistical supply routes between Rwanda and M23.

• Human Rights Watch (HRW), reports 2012–2024.
• Amnesty International, North Kivu conflict assessments.
• Global Witness, investigations on financial and mining networks linked to M23/RDF.

• Congo Research Group (CRG), New York University.
• International Crisis Group (ICG), reports on eastern DRC dynamics.
• Rift Valley Institute (RVI), publications on Great Lakes political-military networks.

• BBC Africa Eye, investigations on M23 and Rwanda.
• Reuters investigative dossiers on RDF deployments.
• The New York Times, geopolitical analyses of Rwanda's role.
• Le Monde (France), detailed reporting on coordinated M23 offensives.

 

La guerre diplomatique et militaire du Rwanda en RDC

La guerre diplomatique et militaire du Rwanda en RDC : intensification des offensives du M23/RDF pendant les voyages de  Paul Kagame et Felix Tshisekedi, et les attitudes déguisées d'un dirigeant dont les stratégies sont pourtant connues de tous

Depuis plus de deux décennies, la crise de l'Est de la République démocratique du Congo s'inscrit dans un jeu géopolitique complexe où les dynamiques militaires, les stratégies diplomatiques et les discours politiques se croisent, se contredisent et se masquent mutuellement. Au centre de ces contradictions se trouve un phénomène que de nombreux chercheurs, diplomates, journalistes d'investigation et organismes internationaux ont documenté : les offensives du M23 — groupe armé soutenu selon plusieurs rapports par l'armée rwandaise (RDF) — s'intensifient précisément lorsque Paul Kagame est en voyage à l'étranger.

Plus récemment, une tendance similaire a émergé : les offensives du M23/RDF s'accélèrent également lorsque le président congolais Félix Tshisekedi se trouve hors du pays, soit pour des réunions internationales, des sommets politiques ou des missions diplomatiques.

Ces deux réalités, lorsqu'elles sont combinées, dévoilent une stratégie globale où la diplomatie et le calendrier politique deviennent des armes utilisées pour maximiser les gains militaires, brouiller les responsabilités, exploiter les vulnérabilités régionales et maintenir une façade internationale de respectabilité.

Mais au cœur de cette stratégie se trouve quelque chose de plus profond : les attitudes déguisées de Paul Kagame, qui nie systématiquement son implication dans la guerre en RDC, alors même que les preuves s'accumulent dans les rapports et que la communauté internationale sait pertinemment ce qu'il se passe. C'est un jeu d'ombres où tout le monde connaît la vérité, mais où la diplomatie, l'économie et les intérêts stratégiques étouffent toute condamnation ferme.

Ce texte de 3000 mots analyse cette dynamique complexe en trois dimensions :

1. Le rôle central du Rwanda dans les opérations du M23, y compris lors des voyages de Kagame.
2. L'exploitation de la vulnérabilité congolaise lors des déplacements de Tshisekedi.
3. Les attitudes déguisées de Kagame, connues mais rarement dénoncées ouvertement.

 

I. Quand Kagame voyage, le M23 attaque : structure d'une stratégie bien rodée

1. Une intensification des offensives impossible à ignorer

Depuis 2012, et plus encore depuis la résurgence du M23 en 2021, les experts internationaux observent un phénomène troublant : chaque fois que Paul Kagame quitte le Rwanda pour une mission diplomatique à l'étranger, les attaques du M23 s'intensifient dans l'Est du Congo.

Il ne s'agit pas d'un hasard statistique. Les offensives gagnent en puissance, en coordination et en précision. Des localités stratégiques sont prises. Des axes routiers essentiels sont coupés. Les FARDC reculent. Les civils fuient.

Ces offensives suivent un schéma qui, lorsqu'il est observé sur plusieurs années, devient impossible à ignorer.

2. Une structure militaire rwandaise qui ne dépend pas de la présence physique du président

Les analystes soulignent une réalité fondamentale : la présence physique de Kagame n'est pas nécessaire pour que le système militaire rwandais continue à fonctionner à pleine puissance.

L'armée rwandaise, l'une des plus disciplinées et centralisées du continent, opère selon une chaîne de commandement verticale extrêmement loyale au président. Les objectifs stratégiques sont définis bien en amont, et le M23 reçoit — selon de nombreux rapports — :

• du soutien en renseignements,
• de la logistique,
• des armes sophistiquées,
• des officiers,
• des unités de renfort,
• des drones,
• des munitions,
• et des formations spécialisées.

Ainsi, même lorsque Kagame est dans un avion, dans un hôtel ou assis sur un panel lors d'une conférence internationale, les offensives du M23/RDF se poursuivent sans interruption.

3. L'utilisation du voyage comme masque politique

L'un des éléments les plus sensibles de cette analyse est l'usage diplomatique que Kagame semble faire de ses déplacements internationaux.

Lorsque des offensives se produisent pendant qu'il représente le Rwanda dans des sommets régionaux, des conférences de sécurité mondiale ou des rencontres bilatérales, il peut facilement affirmer n'avoir aucune responsabilité, puisqu'il se trouve physiquement loin des événements.

C'est une stratégie simple, mais diablement efficace :
être ailleurs pour mieux nier.

4. Les attitudes déguisées de Kagame, une façade qui n'abuse plus personne

Officiellement, Kagame affirme que :

• Le Rwanda n'a aucun lien avec le M23.
• Les RDF ne participent pas aux combats en RDC.
• Le problème vient des FDLR, qu'il utilise comme justification.
• Le Rwanda est un acteur de paix injustement accusé.

Mais ces discours sont devenus du théâtre diplomatique, car dans les couloirs des organisations internationales, dans les chancelleries occidentales et dans les institutions africaines, tout le monde connaît la vérité.

5. Tout le monde sait — mais personne n'agit vraiment

Les rapports de l'ONU documentent précisément le soutien militaire rwandais.
Les services de renseignement régionaux et occidentaux confirment les analyses.
Les journalistes d'investigation publient des preuves détaillées.
Les diplomates reconnaissent en privé la responsabilité du Rwanda.

Pourtant, Kagame continue de nier, avec assurance, calme et maîtrise, et cette attitude déguisée est devenue une signature politique :
un mélange de déni, d'arrogance diplomatique et de confiance totale en l'impunité internationale.

II. Quand Tshisekedi voyage, le M23 avance : exploitation des faiblesses structurelles de la RDC

1. Un appareil militaire fragile qui dépend du leadership du président

À l'opposé du Rwanda, la RDC souffre d'une armée :

• sous-équipée,
• infiltrée,
• minée par la corruption,
• affaiblie par des rivalités internes,
• et dépourvue d'une doctrine militaire claire.

Dans ce contexte, la présence du président Tshisekedi est essentielle. Elle sert de catalyseur pour l'unité du commandement, la rapidité des décisions et la mobilisation politique de l'armée.

Lorsque Tshisekedi est à l'étranger, cette cohésion se fissure.

2. Le M23/RDF profite de chaque moment de vacance politique

Les rapports montrent que :

• les FARDC réagissent moins vite,
• les ordres tardent à être exécutés,
• les officiers hésitent,
• les opérations perdent en coordination,
• les lignes de défense deviennent vulnérables.

Le M23/RDF, parfaitement informé des mouvements diplomatiques de Tshisekedi, profite de cette faiblesse temporaire pour avancer.

3. Prises de villes stratégiques pendant les voyages de Tshisekedi

À plusieurs reprises, des localités clés sont tombées précisément pendant les déplacements du président :

• Bunagana,
• Rutshuru,
• Tongo,
• Mweso,
• Kishishe,
• et d'autres encore.

Ces captures ne sont jamais accidentelles. Elles sont planifiées pour :

• humilier politiquement Tshisekedi,
• affaiblir son message diplomatique,
• créer la perception d'un État absent et impuissant,
• renforcer la position du M23 dans les négociations futures.

4. Une tactique d'opportunisme stratégique

Le Rwanda exploite ainsi deux moments favorables :

• Quand Kagame voyage, son absence sert de couverture diplomatique.
• Quand Tshisekedi voyage, son absence crée une vulnérabilité militaire.

Cette double stratégie permet d'avancer, d'occuper, de consolider des positions tout en brouillant les responsabilités.

III. Une diplomatie de façade : les attitudes déguisées de Kagame, connues mais tolérées

1. Un chef d'État qui nie l'évidence

Paul Kagame maîtrise un style politique où le déni devient une technique diplomatique :

• nier les opérations,
• ridiculiser les accusations,
• inverser les responsabilités,
• présenter le Rwanda comme victime,
• accuser les FDLR comme menace universelle.

Cette attitude, pourtant connue comme une stratégie, fonctionne parce que Kagame :

• bénéficie d'alliances puissantes,
• contrôle étroitement son image internationale,
• sait manipuler les contradictions géopolitiques,
• profite de l'indifférence ou de l'hypocrisie internationale.

2. Une vérité que « tout le monde connaît »

Dans les institutions internationales :

• les diplomates savent,
• les analystes savent,
• les experts savent,
• les ONG savent,
• les militaires savent,
• les Congolais savent.

Sans conteste, les attitudes de Kagame ne trompent personne. Elles ne sont tolérées que parce que des puissances étrangères considèrent le Rwanda comme :

• un partenaire stratégique,
• un État stable dans une région instable,
• un fournisseur de troupes pour les opérations de paix,
• un allié contre le terrorisme,
• un acteur clé pour l'exploitation minière régionale.

3. Une impunité qui nourrit la guerre

Comme aucune sanction sérieuse n'est prise :

• les opérations militaires se poursuivent,
• le M23 consolide ses positions,
• les civils continuent de fuir,
• les accusations se multiplient,
• mais le Rwanda nie encore et toujours.

Cette impunité fait partie de la stratégie.

Conclusion : une guerre qui se joue sur trois terrains

Le conflit de l'Est du Congo ne se comprend pas uniquement à travers les fusils, les drones et les tranchées. Il se joue aussi :

1. sur le terrain diplomatique, où Kagame utilise ses voyages comme un masque politique ;
2. sur le terrain institutionnel, où les absences de Tshisekedi affaiblissent temporairement la cohésion militaire de la RDC ;
3. sur le terrain psychologique, où les attitudes déguisées du Rwanda, connues de tous mais rarement dénoncées, façonnent un climat d'impunité internationale.

Il s'agit d'une guerre hybride où l'image, le timing politique, la désinformation et les alliances stratégiques sont aussi importants que les armes.

Références

Rapports des Nations Unies

• Nations Unies, Groupe d'experts sur la RDC : Rapports 2012, 2013, 2014, 2018, 2022, 2023.
• S/2022/479 – Implication d'unités RDF dans des opérations du M23.
• S/2023/573 – Documentation sur les axes logistiques entre le Rwanda et le M23.

• Human Rights Watch (HRW), rapports 2012–2024.
• Amnesty International, analyses sur la crise du Nord-Kivu.
• Global Witness – Enquêtes sur le financement du M23 et l'exploitation des minerais.

• Congo Research Group (CRG), études sur le M23 et les réseaux politico-militaires.
• International Crisis Group (ICG), publications sur la crise de l'Est de la RDC.
• Rift Valley Institute (RVI), analyses sur les dynamiques des Grands Lacs.

• BBC Africa Eye, enquêtes sur le M23 et le Rwanda.
• Reuters, reportages sur la participation rwandaise.
• New York Times, analyses géopolitiques sur la crise du Congo.
• Le Monde, dossiers sur les offensives coordonnées du M23.

 

Burundi: An Indispensable Actor in the Quest for Peace in the Great Lakes Region – Analysis of a Major Diplomatic Turning Point

Introduction

Burundi's official invitation to participate in the signing of the Washington Accords between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), scheduled for 4 December 2025, marks a diplomatic turning point whose significance extends far beyond the symbolic (Mwangi, 2025). This event represents not only international recognition of Burundi's stabilising role, but also a strategic repositioning within the complex geopolitics of the Great Lakes region. Long marginalised or underestimated, Burundi is now emerging as a central actor in the search for lasting peace in a region marked by decades of conflict, foreign interference, forced displacement and geopolitical rivalries.

International Recognition of Burundi's Role

Burundi's invitation to a bilateral agreement between Rwanda and the DRC constitutes an exception in diplomatic practice. Ordinarily, such negotiations are conducted behind closed doors, between the two directly concerned states and mediating powers. The fact that Burundi has been invited alongside Kenyan President William Ruto demonstrates that its diplomatic position has been strengthened to the point of being perceived as a guarantee of stability and credibility (Odongo, 2025). International partners now recognise that any lasting solution to the crises in eastern DRC must necessarily include Burundi.

This recognition is the fruit of the Burundian government's consistent commitment to regional security. Burundi deployed troops to eastern DRC as part of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in March 2023, demonstrating its capacity to intervene in a disciplined and professional manner (East African Community, 2023). Regional partners consider the Burundian army, strengthened by its international experience gained notably in Somalia under AMISOM, to be one of the best prepared in the fight against armed groups, particularly in difficult areas such as South Kivu (Maina, 2023).

Burundi as a Natural Mediator in a Deeply Rooted Crisis

The crisis in eastern DRC cannot be reduced to a simple military confrontation; it forms part of a complex historical configuration involving border issues, ethnic rivalries, illegal exploitation of natural resources, geopolitical ambitions and the involvement of foreign actors. The current conflict, marked by the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23) since 2021, experienced dramatic escalation in January 2025 with the rebel capture of Goma and Bukavu, supported according to UN reports by thousands of Rwandan soldiers (Wikipedia, 2025a).

Burundi, unlike other states in the region, has no expansionist ambitions nor direct economic interests in the conflict. This neutrality confers a major diplomatic advantage: being perceived as a credible mediator, capable of listening, reassuring and bringing positions closer together. Over the years, Bujumbura has strengthened its relations with both Kinshasa and Kigali, whilst preserving its strategic independence.

An Indispensable Military Presence in the Future Regional Order

An Operational and Respected Army

The Burundian National Defence Forces (FDNB) have deployed between 8,000 and 12,000 soldiers in eastern DRC, distributed across sixteen battalions operating primarily in South Kivu (African Security Analysis, 2025). Their presence has proved decisive in stabilising the region, particularly against M23's advance. Unlike other foreign forces operating in the DRC, the Burundian army enjoys a largely positive perception amongst local populations and Congolese authorities, being considered disciplined, effective and faithful to its security mandate (SOS Médias Burundi, 2025).

This military effectiveness has made Burundi indispensable in the current security dynamic. Burundian forces have contributed to blocking the advance of violent rebel movements, securing key border areas, supporting the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) in recapturing strategic localities, and reducing attacks against civilian populations. Without the Burundian presence, the security equation in South Kivu would be considerably more unstable.

A Pragmatic and Clear Foreign Policy

Unlike other governments in the region, often criticised for their interference or opaque agendas, Burundi has adopted a diplomacy of transparency, dialogue and non-aggression. This positioning reassures international partners who see Burundi as a stability factor rather than a source of tension. Burundi is one of the few countries in the region to be accused neither of pillaging Congolese natural resources nor of supporting rebel groups operating against its neighbours.

A Unique Capacity to Engage with All Actors

Burundi maintains contacts with various communities, governments and regional organisations, enabling it to play a bridging role. Its detailed knowledge of the region's politico-ethnic dynamics also enables it to intervene where other countries would be perceived as biased. This balanced position explains why the United States, as organisers of the Washington Accords, deemed it essential to invite Burundi to this historic signing.

4 December 2025: A Symbolic Date for Burundian Diplomacy

When the Washington Accords signing ceremony takes place on 4 December 2025, it will not merely be a protocol gesture. The Washington Accords, initially signed by foreign ministers in June 2025, aim for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from eastern DRC and the Congolese government's eradication of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) militia, whilst establishing a framework for regional economic integration based on critical minerals trade (Wikipedia, 2025b).

This will be a moment of international validation of Burundi's role in regional stabilisation. Its presence will confirm that it is no longer a mere observer of Great Lakes region dynamics, but a guarantor and key partner in developing lasting solutions. Burundi will also be able to defend its vision of inclusive peace, based on combating foreign interference, strengthening national capacities, regional cooperation and protecting civilian populations.

Burundi's Security Concerns Regarding Regional Ambitions

Beyond its commitment to regional stability, Burundi also acts out of concern for its own national security. In Bujumbura, numerous political and military officials believe that if Rwanda succeeds in consolidating its influence or controlling the entire Kivu region, this could create a major strategic imbalance on Burundi's borders.

In Burundian security circles, the dominant analysis is clear: if Rwanda extends its military and political control over eastern DRC, it will possess strategic depth enabling it to exert direct pressure on Burundi, or even threaten its stability. Kivu would then become a rear base for projecting influence, weakening Burundian positions or supporting groups hostile to Bujumbura's government.

The RED-Tabara Question and Tensions with Rwanda

Burundi considers that the RED-Tabara armed group (Resistance for Rule of Law in Burundi) was created, supported and used by Rwanda as an instrument of destabilisation against its government. Created in 2015 following a failed military coup, RED-Tabara is estimated to have between 500 and 800 fighters operating from South Kivu in the DRC (Hajayandi, 2024).

This conviction is based on numerous elements identified by Burundian security services over the years, notably repeated attacks launched from Rwandan territory and the presumed training of fighters inside Rwanda. UN Group of Experts reports confirmed in 2016 that captured RED-Tabara members stated they had been recruited in refugee camps in Rwanda and trained by people in Rwandan military uniforms (Hajayandi, 2024).

RED-Tabara attacks have intensified since late 2023, notably the deadly Gatumba attack in December 2023 which killed at least 20 people. In response to these events, President Évariste Ndayishimiye accused Rwanda of financing and training RED-Tabara rebels (VOA News, 2023). Consequently, and faced with the progressive deterioration of bilateral relations, the border between Burundi and Rwanda has been closed since January 2024, illustrating the extreme level of mistrust between the two countries (The East African, 2024).

This closure also constitutes a protective measure for Burundi, which seeks to prevent infiltrations by armed groups capable of threatening its internal stability. Rwanda's alleged support for RED-Tabara can be interpreted as an effort to undermine Burundi's military support to the DRC in its struggle against M23 (Hajayandi, 2024).

A New Chapter for the Great Lakes Region

Burundi's invitation to participate in the Washington Accords marks a genuine shift in regional balance. For a long time, the Rwanda-Uganda axis dominated the politico-military scene in the Great Lakes. Today, a new actor – Burundi – is asserting itself with growing influence, responsible diplomacy and a capacity to inspire confidence.

This repositioning could contribute to building a new regional order, founded on cooperation rather than confrontation, and on solidarity rather than competition. Burundi now represents a model of political and diplomatic resilience, capable of transforming its own complex past into a force for regional stability.

The signing of the Washington Accords on 4 December 2025, in the presence of Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye alongside his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame and Congolese counterpart Félix Tshisekedi, symbolises this new geopolitical reality. It enshrines Burundi's role not only as a stabilising military force on the ground, but also as an indispensable diplomatic partner in building lasting peace in the Great Lakes region.

Conclusion

Burundi's invitation to the Washington Accords of 4 December 2025 reflects a profound transformation of the geopolitical landscape in the Great Lakes region. This international recognition rests on three fundamental pillars: a professional and respected army, pragmatic and balanced diplomacy, and concrete commitment to regional security without an expansionist agenda.

Burundi now appears as an indispensable actor whose military presence in South Kivu has contributed to stabilising a critical security situation. Its capacity to maintain relations with all regional actors, whilst preserving its strategic independence, makes it a credible mediator in a conflict where geopolitical, economic and ethnic interests intertwine in complex ways.

In a context where M23, supported by Rwanda according to UN reports, now controls extensive territories including Goma and Bukavu, and where more than 6.7 million people have been displaced, Burundi's stabilising role becomes all the more crucial. The Washington Accords, which aim to end decades of conflict in eastern DRC, cannot ignore an actor who contributes concretely to reducing violence on the ground.

History may remember 4 December 2025 as the day when Burundi moved from a marginal position to that of a central actor in the Great Lakes peace architecture. This evolution demonstrates a country's capacity to transform its internal challenges into diplomatic opportunities and to establish itself as a stabilising force in one of Africa's most complex regions.

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References

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